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Abstract: We study spatial competition in the agricultural input procurement sector by explaining
variability in corn cash price offers from grain merchants in Iowa. While rail access, river access, size,
and ethanol production exhibit the expected positive relationships to corn cash prices, the impact of
ownership structure (corporate or cooperative) is complex. Taking distance-based and density-based
approaches to spatial competition, we find corporate and cooperative grain merchants differ in their
pricing behavior when confronted with spatial competitors. Consistent with theoretical expectations,
cooperative grain merchants play a yardstick role in relation to both corporate and cooperative
grain merchants.
Keywords: spatial competition; agricultural cooperative; imperfect competition; firm behavior
1. Introduction
Producers of farm outputs are dispersed across a vast space. As the outputs are often bulky
and perishable, the associated cost of transportation to buyers is considerable. The geographic size
of the market is therefore effectively reduced to a few buyers in the local or regional market, which
introduces a spatial component to competition in agricultural input procurement [1,2]. Indeed, many
ratios indicate the presence of monopsonies and oligopsonies in agriculture [3], in particular at the
local level [4].
Under imperfect competition in the local or regional market, sellers may be susceptible to spatial
price discrimination. If so, the difference in the prices offered by spatial competitors at two separate
locations is not explained by the cost of transportation [5]. Instead, buyers of farm outputs use
discriminatory pricing to exert local market power. Oligopsony power is manifested by various pricing
strategies, but mill pricing is arguably the most common with each seller receiving the same price
regardless of distance. As such, the cost of transportation is borne by the seller, not the buyer.
Spatial price discrimination is of great current interest considering the fragile position of farm
producers in the agri-food value chain [6]. Many farm producers have been able to protect and enhance
their position by forming and joining cooperatives, which have been successful and even dominant
in many sectors of the European and North American agri-food industries [7,8]. Nonetheless, the
farm share of the food dollar continues to decrease, and the community is encouraged to improve
transparency and reduce information asymmetry to limit spatial price discrimination [6].
In contrast to the vast literature on international trade [9], applied research on the topic of spatial
price competition in local and regional agri-food environments is relatively scarce. Even the grain
sector, which is an integral part of the global food market, has not received much empirical attention
from a spatial perspective at the micro-level (i.e., local or regional). Two notable exceptions are Davis
and Hill [10] and Campbell and Schmiesing [11], who explored explanations for variability in cash
prices at local grain elevators in the Midwest of the United States. While important, these studies
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are now outdated considering recent developments in the grain sector, such as increases in vertical
coordination and industry concentration [4,12], which may impact the pricing behavior of grain
merchants in relation to grain producers.
Considering the above, we perceive a considerable gap in our collective understanding of spatial
price competition in local grain markets. Our research question is as follows: What are possible
explanations for variability in corn cash prices in Iowa? We approach our research question by
investigating grain merchant and spatial competition characteristics in relation to 589 observations
of corn cash prices in Iowa. Iowa, which had the largest production of corn in the United States at
2.6 billion bushels in 2017, is an interesting case study considering the relatively large number of
buyers and sellers.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, recent studies of spatial price competition in
the agricultural input procurement market have been limited primarily to the dairy industry [13,14].
Our study produces the first evidence of spatial price competition in the grain sector since Davis and
Hill [10] and Campbell and Schmiesing [11]. Second, like Boone and Özcan [15], our study illustrates
the importance of considering the interaction effect of ownership structure and strategic behavior in
comparative case studies of cooperatives and non-cooperatives. While cooperative grain merchants on
average offered relatively low corn cash prices, the difference in pricing behavior is explained in part
by the interaction between the ownership structures of grain merchants and its spatial competitors.
Third, while there is already evidence in the prior literature of the yardstick effect of cooperatives
on non-cooperatives [16], our study proves the effect also applies to other cooperatives. Instead of
colluding or cooperating, the result indicates grain marketing cooperatives engage in stiff price-based
competition to secure corn supplies by exploiting spatial characteristics.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology behind the empirical study. We
present the data and the variables in Section 3. We discuss the results in Section 4, and we conclude in
Section 5.
2. Methodology
Although the objective of the study is to investigate spatial price competition, the specification of
a spatial model is not practical or appropriate for the following three reasons: (i) common diagnostics
reject the presence of spatial dependence in Iowa corn prices, (ii) the scalar parameters in trial
estimations of the spatial lag model, the spatial error model, and the spatial Durbin model did
not exhibit statistical significance, and (iii) the inclusion of two spatial weight matrices to model spatial
price dependency in relation to corporate and cooperative grain merchants is impossible in the same
model. Therefore, we instead specify an ordinary least squares (OLS) model with custom spatial
variables to investigate spatial price competition among grain merchants in Iowa.
The basic model is specified as
yi = α+ βxi + τpi + ϕzi + εi (1)
where y is the corn cash price offered by the grain merchant i, x is the vector of grain merchant
characteristics, p is the vector of spatial competition characteristics, z is the vector of control variables, ε
is the stochastic term with a mean zero and variance one, and β, τ, and ϑ are the unknown parameters
to be estimated.
Of primary interest to the empirical study is vector p. As will be further explained in the next
section, we take distance and density-based perspectives of spatial competition. In addition, we also
explore the heterogeneous grain pricing behavior of corporate and cooperative grain merchants in
relation to other nearby corporate and cooperative grain merchants by means of interaction terms,
as in:
yi = α+ βxi + τ1(coop× coop) + τ2(coop× f irm) + τ3( f irm× coop)
+τ4( f irm× f irm) + ϕzi + εi (2)
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where each symbol and subscript is as before. The exact composition of the vectors is explained in the
next section. The analysis is conducted in Stata 15.
3. Data and Variables
3.1. Outcome Variable
The point of departure is the list of 314 licensed grain merchants of the Grain Warehouse Bureau
at the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship. By definition, a licensed grain merchant
is an individual or organisation that purchases at least 1000 bushels (one bushel = 56 pounds = 25.4 kg)
of grain per month from producers in Iowa.
We collected information from 148 merchants in Iowa offering a cash price for No. 2 yellow corn on
Friday, October 5, 2018. Early October is in the midst of the corn harvest season. We collected most of the
information from the websites of the merchants. In some instances, we collected information by phone.
We also used GeoGrain, which maintains a database of commodity cash bid data, to supplement and
corroborate our information. In total, we recorded corn cash price offers at 589 locations. The statistical
distribution of the data is illustrated in Figure 1. For the sake of reference, the most relevant corn
futures quote was $3.682 (ZCZ18), which represents the price for corn to be delivered in December 2018.
Figure 2 presents the geographical distribution of the 589 corn cash price observations.
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Figure 1. Distribution of 589 Corn Cash Prices in Iowa on October 5, 2018.
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3.2. Grain Merchant Characteristics
3.2.1. Ownership Structure
The consideration of ownership structures is important as cooperatives and non-cooperatives have
different objectives. While the stereotypical firm is a profit maximizer, most cooperatives have mixed
and competing objectives with many parameters and constraints [17,18]. Notably, cooperatives are
often formed in times of imperfect competition to force non-cooperatives to stay or become honest [1].
The relationship of cash prices to the absence and presence of cooperatives has been studied previously
in the empirical literature [19], but the overall evidence is scarce [16].
We created a binary variable to denote the ownership structure of the grain merchant. We consider
two forms: cooperatives and corporations, where the latter is composed of sole proprietorships,
partnerships, limited liability companies, or corporations (i.e., non-cooperatives). Fifty-four of the 148
merchants in our database are owned collectively by organized farm producers (see Table 1). However,
cooperatives operate most of the grain merchant locations in the state of Iowa (404 of 589).
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Table 1. Summary Statistics.
Variable Mean Median S.D.
Outcome Variable
Corn Cash Price (cents/bu) 319.87 320.00 6.08
Grain Merchant Characteristics
Cooperative 0.69 1.00 0.46
Rail Access 0.49 0.00 0.50
River Access 0.03 0.00 0.16
Number of Locations 18.09 9.00 21.95
Ethanol Plant 0.06 0.00 0.24
Spatial Competition Characteristics
Distance to Nearest Competitor (km) 10.16 9.81 6.00
Distance to Nearest Cooperative (km) 14.34 12.49 8.91
Distance to Nearest Firm (km) 16.61 15.50 10.06
Number of Competitors within 15 km 1.98 2.00 1.70
Number of Cooperatives within 15 km 1.20 1.00 1.27
Number of Firms within 15 km 0.77 0.00 1.03
Control Variables
Northwest 0.19 0.00 0.39
North Central 0.14 0.00 0.35
Northeast 0.11 0.00 0.31
West Central 0.14 0.00 0.35
Central 0.19 0.00 0.39
East Central 0.07 0.00 0.26
Southwest 0.04 0.00 0.21
South Central 0.04 0.00 0.21
Southeast 0.07 0.00 0.25
Planted Acreage of Corn in County (×1000) 159.39 167.50 51.30
3.2.2. Rail or Barge Access
While trucking is the dominant mode of transportation between the farm and the elevator,
access to railroads and rivers at grain merchant locations is important to facilitate more cost-efficient
transportation to non-local markets [20]. The ability to transport corn by rail or barge may indicate
opportunities to lower the price due to cost efficiency or to increase the price because of improved
market access.
Informed by satellite imagery (i.e., Google Maps), immediate access to a railroad or the Mississippi
River on the eastern border or the Missouri River on the western border is denoted by binary variables.
Almost half of the grain merchant locations in Iowa have rail access. Only 16 of the observed grain
merchant locations have immediate access to the river. Twelve of these 16 grain merchant locations
also have rail access.
3.2.3. Firm Size
Firm size is often associated with superior financial performance by facilitating market access and
scale efficiency [21]. The operation of multiple locations within a geographic area may constitute an
entry barrier to potential competitors and thus facilitate spatial price discrimination. At the same time,
however, relatively large grain merchants may operate in non-local market environments and thus
face increased price-based competition from both cooperatives and non-cooperatives, which implies a
lower capacity to discriminate by price.
In the absence of detailed survey data on capacity, the size of each grain merchant is indicated
by the number of locations. Of the 148 merchants in our database, only 79 have a single location.
Furthermore, 125 of the 148 merchants have five or fewer locations, which implies the competitive
landscape is shaped by many small and few large buyers.
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3.2.4. Ethanol Producer
Driven by the Renewable Fuel Standard, ethanol producers are large buyers of corn and therefore
have a positive impact on local prices [22,23]. Proximity to an ethanol plant is also associated with
higher land values [24]. According to the Iowa Renewable Fuels Association, 43 bio-ethanol producers
existed in the state of Iowa at the time of the study. We created a binary variable to denote if the grain
merchant is an ethanol producer.
3.3. Spatial Competition Characteristics
The degree of spatial competition in the Iowa corn market is informed by two types of variables.
Following Alvarez et al. [13], who studied oligopsony power in the milk procurement market of
Asturias, Spain, we take both a density-based and a distance-based approach to model the spatial
character of competition. Consistent with our objective of studying the interaction between grain
merchant and spatial competition characteristics, we also differentiate between cooperative and
corporate grain merchants. Each variable excludes all other locations by the same owners. Also, the
state of Iowa is treated as an isolated location, which implies observations across the border are not
considered as competitors.
3.4. Control Variables
We address heterogeneity in the external environment with two types of control variables. First,
we create a series of binary variables for the nine districts used by USDA-NASS. Second, we account
for the local supply of corn by including the total amount of planted acreage of corn by county.
4. Results
Corresponding to Equation (1), we first present two models with a distance-based approach to
spatial competition, and then two models with a density-based approach. For each approach, we
present a model without, and then with consideration of ownership structures (i.e., corporate or
cooperative grain merchant). Then, corresponding to Equation (2), we proceed to an interaction model
to not only consider the ownership structures of the competitors but also the ownership structures of
the observations, thus studying the possibility of heterogeneous spatial price behavior.
4.1. Spatial Price Competition—Distance
As per the results, we observe a significant relationship of grain merchant characteristics to corn
cash prices (see Table 2). Rail and river access both positively relate to the cash price by magnitudes
of ¢1.21–1.33 and ¢6.72–8.06 per bushel. The result is comparable to Davis and Hill [10], who found
barge shipment capabilities had a positive impact of ¢4.50 per bushel on corn cash prices in Illinois.
While measured differently, Davis and Hill [10] also reported a positive relationship of rail access to
corn cash prices. Our result indicates grain merchants with an ability to transport by rail or barge offer
higher cash prices to input suppliers. The premium is likely facilitated by improvements in market
access and scale efficiency. The ensuing improvement in the operating margin of the grain merchant is
then in part transferred to the corn producer.
In addition, organisational size, which is indicated by the total number of locations, is estimated to
positively relate to corn cash prices. Each additional location is associated with a ¢0.05 increase in the
corn cash price. With 18 locations, the average grain merchant in the sample is therefore able to offer
almost $0.01 per bushel more as compared to grain merchants with only a single location. The result
is sensible from an economic perspective as the ability to lower the average cost of production to
the minimum is predicated on size, suggesting an increase in labour and capital produces an even
greater increase in output. Also, while increasing the service territory with more locations, grain
merchants may be able to spread the existing cost of contracting, transporting, and other related
expenses. Generally, our result corroborates prior findings by Schroeder [25] and Ariyaratne et al. [26]
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regarding the superior scale efficiency of relatively large grain marketing cooperatives. In addition,
our result constitutes evidence of the main motivation behind the ongoing consolidation among grain
marketing cooperatives in the United States [27]. The prolific merger and acquisition activity is driven
by the need to improve efficiency so as to remain relevant to relatively large buyers.
Table 2. Determinants of Corn Cash Prices—Distance-Based Models.
Distance Model 1 Distance Model 2
Intercept 318.348 ***(1.320)
318.210 ***
(1.400)
Grain Merchant Characteristics
Cooperative −1.039(0.697)
−1.045
(0.689)
Rail Access 1.213 **(0.471)
1.333 ***
(0.467)
River Access 6.723 ***(2.108)
8.064 ***
(2.171)
Number of Locations 0.049 ***(0.012)
0.053 ***
(0.012)
Ethanol Producer 6.087 ***(1.168)
6.168 ***
(1.188)
Spatial Competition Characteristics
Distance to Nearest Competitor −0.116 **(0.048)
Distance to Nearest Cooperative −0.102 ***(0.033)
Distance to Nearest Firm 0.006(0.031)
Control Variables Included Included
N 589 589
F 12.51 12.36
R2 0.28 0.29
Statistical significance at the 95% and 99% confidence levels is denoted by ** and ***, respectively.
Corresponding to McNew and Griffith [22], we also find a positive and significant relationship
of ethanol production to corn cash prices. On average, ethanol producers offer ¢6.09–6.17 per bushel
more as compared to other grain merchants. Our estimate is within the ¢4.63–19.33 range of the
estimated price impact at ethanol production sites in the study by McNew and Griffith [22], which
included observations from Iowa. The premium is in part established by the tax credit offered by
the US government to corn ethanol producers. The tax credit enables ethanol producers to bid more
aggressively on the local market to secure enough supply to operate at capacity. In general, our result
indicates the presence of ethanol producers, which are high-volume consumers of corn, increases the
quantity demanded and thus drives the equilibrium price of corn in the local market upward.
In terms of spatial competition, we first include the variable that measures the distance to the
nearest competitor, regardless of the ownership structure. Per the estimate, the cash price offered by
the average grain merchant decreases by ¢0.12 per bushel as the distance to the nearest competitor
increases by one kilometer. The further the nearest competitor, the lower the cash price offered.
The significant result is indicative of spatial price discrimination by grain merchants. The nearest
competitor is at a distance of 10.16 kilometers for the average grain merchant in Iowa, which implies
an ability to discriminate by approximately ¢1.20 per bushel. Economically, an amount of ¢1.20 per
bushel is not trivial. Assuming an average yield of 200 bushels per acre, the per acre impact of price
discrimination amounts to $2.40.
However, as illustrated by the second distance-based model, it is imperative to also consider the
ownership structure of the nearest competitor. Per the results, the distance to the nearest corporate
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grain merchant is inconsequential to the pricing behavior of the average grain merchant. Instead, what
matters is the distance to the nearest cooperative grain merchant. For each kilometer separating the
average grain merchant and the nearest cooperative grain merchant, the corn cash price decreases by
¢0.10 per bushel. Our result is evidence of the yardstick role performed by cooperatives in the case of
imperfect competition to limit the monopsony or oligopsony power of non-cooperatives [1]. In doing
so, grain marketing cooperatives have a positive impact on the welfare of local grain producers.
4.2. Spatial Price Competition—Density
When changing the measurement of spatial competition from distance to density, we observe the
same results as before (see Table 3). The magnitude of the estimated impact of the grain merchant
characteristics (i.e., rail access, river access, size, ethanol producer) on the corn cash price is similar.
The interpretation of the relationship of grain merchants and spatial competitors to corn cash prices is
also similar. First, without consideration of the ownership structure, we observe a positive impact of
competitors within a 15-km radius on the corn cash price. For each additional competitor within a
15-km radius of the average grain merchant, the corn cash price increases by ¢0.54 per bushel. Thus, the
denser the competition in the local market, the higher the corn cash price offered. Once again, however,
we must consider the ownership structure as the pricing behavior of the average grain merchant is
different in relation to corporate grain merchants and cooperative grain merchants. On average, grain
merchants do not adjust corn cash prices in response to the presence of corporate grain merchants
within a 15-km radius. In the case of cooperative grain merchants, however, the corn cash price is
estimated to increase by ¢1.01 per bushel. The density-based model thus corroborates the finding
produced by the distance-based model.
Table 3. Determinants of Corn Cash Prices—Density-Based Models.
Density Model 1 Density Model 2
Intercept 316.002 ***(1.340)
315.677 ***
(1.317)
Grain Merchant Characteristics
Cooperative −0.901(0.707)
−0.597
(0.710)
Rail Access 1.333 ***(0.461)
1.393 ***
(0.456)
River Access 7.206 ***(2.035)
7.402 ***
(1.987)
Number of Locations 0.050 ***(0.012)
0.053 ***
(0.012)
Ethanol Producer 6.055 ***(1.159)
6.008 ***
(1.160)
Spatial Competition Characteristics
# of Competitors—15 km 0.535 ***(0.146)
# of Cooperatives—15 km 1.006 ***(0.202)
# of Corporations—15 km −0.077(0.224)
Control Variables Included Included
N 589 589
F 13.37 12.86
R2 0.29 0.30
Statistical significance at the 99% confidence level is denoted by ***.
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4.3. Spatial Price Competition—Interaction
Finally, in relation to Equation (2), we discuss the results of two models in which we use the
interaction terms to estimate the pricing behavior of corporate and cooperative grain merchants in
response to spatial competition by other corporate and cooperative grain merchants (see Table 4).
We thus consider the ownership structure of the spatial competitor as well as the grain merchant.
Table 4. Determinants of Corn Cash Prices—Interaction Models.
Interaction—Distance Interaction—Density
Intercept 319.945 ***(1.591)
314.974 ***
(1.509)
Grain Merchant Characteristics
Cooperative −4.078 ***(1.468)
0.385
(1.035)
Rail Access 1.400 ***(0.467)
1.391 ***
(0.455)
River Access 8.021 ***(2.299)
7.729 ***
(2.057)
Number of Locations 0.054 ***(0.012)
0.052 ***
(0.012)
Ethanol Producer 6.179 ***(1.161)
5.944 ***
(1.152)
Spatial Competition Characteristics
Cooperative * Cooperatives −0.078 **(0.039)
0.867 ***
(0.228)
Cooperative * Corporations 0.059 *(0.034)
−0.248
(0.236)
Corporation * Cooperatives −0.114 **(0.056)
1.191 ***
(0.362)
Corporation * Corporations −0.109 **(0.055)
0.352
(0.465)
Control Variables Included Included
N 589 589
F 11.47 11.56
R2 0.30 0.31
Statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
In doing so, we reveal corporate and cooperative grain merchants respond differently to spatial
competitors. In the distance-based model, cooperative grain merchants lower corn cash prices by
¢0.08 per bushel as the distance to the nearest cooperative grain merchant increases by one kilometer.
The distance to the nearest corporate grain merchant is determined to have no significant relationship
to its pricing behavior. Corporate grain merchants, however, do not appear to consider the ownership
structure of their nearest competitor as the change in pricing behavior is identical as the distance
increases. For each additional kilometer in the distance to the nearest competitor, the average corporate
grain merchant decreases the corn cash price by ¢0.11 per bushel.
The narrative is somewhat different in relation to the density-based model. When counting
the total number of corporate grain merchants within a 15-km radius, the corn cash prices offered
by both corporate and cooperative grain merchants does not change. Instead, both corporate and
cooperative grain merchants only respond to the intensification of local competition by cooperative
grain merchants. The average cooperative grain merchant increases the corn cash price by ¢0.87 per
bushel in response to each additional cooperative grain merchant within a 15-km radius. The response
by the average corporate grain merchant is even greater in magnitude at ¢1.19 per bushel. For the sake
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of comparison, the original density-based model without consideration of the ownership structure of
the grain merchant yielded an estimate of ¢1.01 per bushel.
Overall, the results of the final distance-based model and the final density-based model yield
several observations. First, the pricing behavior of both corporate and cooperative grain merchants is
not only influenced by the distance, but also by the density of the local competition. However, the total
number of corporate grain merchants may not make a difference. The density-based model should
perhaps be preferred to the distance-based model as (i) the goodness-of-fit of the overall density-based
model is greater, and (ii) the spatial variables in the distance-based model are only significant at the
95% confidence level and not the 99% confidence level. Second, cooperatives do not only perform
a yardstick role for non-cooperatives but also other cooperatives. Competition among cooperatives
is contrary to the foundational values and principles of cooperatives, which includes cooperation
among cooperatives. Price-based competition among grain marketing cooperatives likely contributes
to the recent uptick in merger and acquisition activity. Third, while there is significant evidence of
spatial price discrimination by non-cooperatives, it is surprising to find cooperatives are also capable
of exploiting spatial competition characteristics. The strategic behavior of marketing cooperatives is
not explored in great detail in the literature, although recent studies have illustrated how relatively few
marketing cooperatives use differentiation to pursue competitiveness [28]. More attention ought to be
directed to price-based competition by marketing cooperatives, which strategically is more sensible
considering the upstream bias of its members.
In terms of model fitness, however, it is debatable if the final two models are significantly better
as compared to the prior models. The relative increase in R2 is modest, suggesting the consideration of
heterogeneous pricing behavior by corporate and cooperative grain merchants has not facilitated a vast
improvement in explanatory power. Apparently much of the variance in pricing behaviour attributable
to spatial competition is already captured by relatively simple conceptualizations of distance and
density. Nonetheless, consideration of the ownership structure facilitates a closer approximation of the
real world and should arguably be preferred.
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis
For the sake of robustness, we conducted additional regressions with different subsamples. First,
we studied a sample without ethanol producers (N = 554). We included the distance to the nearest
ethanol producer as another indicator of spatial competition. Consistent with McNew and Griffith [22],
the variable had a significant negative relationship to the corn cash price. Otherwise, the estimates
did not facilitate new or different interpretations. Second, we studied a sample without observations
below the fifth percentile or above the 95th percentile (N = 530). The estimates did not facilitate new or
different interpretations. Third, we studied a sample without observations within 15 kilometers of the
border (N = 517). Again, the estimates did not facilitate new or different interpretations.
We also conducted a series of regressions with different radii for the density-based approach to
spatial competition. Figure 3 illustrates the results of model specifications with radii of 10, 20, 30, 40,
and 50 kilometers. For the sake of reference, the original density-based model contained a 15-km radius.
As the distance of the radius increases, the magnitude of the estimated impact of each additional
spatial competitor on the corn cash price decreases. At the same time, the t-statistic associated with
each estimate increases. The gradual decrease in magnitude is logical because a larger radius contains
a greater number of spatial competitors. The result may imply spatial competitors within a larger
radius are still relevant to the pricing behavior of grain merchants but to an increasingly lesser extent.
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incentives to extend operations to areas in which corporate grain merchants have spatial 
monopsonies or oligopsonies and exert buyer power in relation to local grain producers. For example, 
a few corporate grain merchants dominate the southeast corner of the Iowa corn market. The entry 
of cooperative grain merchants, or perhaps even just the threat of entry, may reduce spatial price 
discrimination and thus facilitate improvements to the welfare of local grain producers. Second, the 
establishment of rail or river access may constitute the best opportunities for grain merchants to 
improve their bidding position on the corn spot market. While immediate access to railroads or rivers 
is often infeasible, grain merchants may seek indirect access by means of partnerships with truckers 
or other merchants. Where possible, grain merchants may also pursue organisational growth through 
the establishment of more locations to achieve scale economies. Third, the evidence of the yardstick 
effect of cooperatives is justification for the policy support. Often characterized as inefficient, it is 
clear that grain marketing cooperatives force improvements in producer welfare in the grain sector 
and thus provide ex-ante production incentives to grain producers. Therefore, policymakers may 
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Figure 3. Point Estimates of the Impact of Cooperative Grain Merchants on the Corn Cash Prices of
Corporate and Cooperative Grain Merchants with Different Radii.
5. Conclusions
Spatial price competition in local or regional grain markets has not received much attention in
recent empirical literature. I light of ngoing decre ses in farm income, w revisited the issue and
produced new evid nce with an empirical study of corporate and cooperative g ain m rchant in Iowa,
which is the largest producer of corn in the United States. With 589 observ ons of corn cash prices
observed in the 2018 harvest season, the study emphasized the interaction etween grain merchant
and spatial competi ion characteristic .
Whether conceptualizing spatial competi on in terms of distance or density, we found evidence of
local buyer power by corporate as we l as cooperative grain merchants. How ver, their pricing behavior
differed wh n confronted with corporate or coo erative grain merchants as spatial competitors.
Conforming to the yardstick effect, spatial competi ion by c operative grain r ts motiv ed
both corporate and cooperative grain merchants to increase corn cash prices. While co tributing o
the prior literature on th strategic choice and behavior of cooperative , our study is arguably th
firs to yield evidence f th yardstick effect of cooperatives in r lation t both non-cooperatives and
other cooperatives.
Our study has s veral rac cal implications. First, cooperative grain merchants may have strong
incentive to extend op tions o reas in which corporate grain merchants have spatial monopsonies
or oligop onies and exert buyer power in latio to local grain producers. For example, a few cor orate
grain merchants dominate the southeast co ner of the Iowa corn m rket. The entry of cooperative
grain merchants, or perhaps even just the threat f entry, may r duce spatial price discrimination and
thus facilitate improvements to the w lfare of local grain producers. Second, the establishment of rail
or river access may constitute he best opportunities for gr in mer hants to improve their bi ding
position on the corn spot market. While immedia access to railroads or rivers is often infeasible,
grain merchants may seek indirect access by means of partnerships w th tru kers o other me chant .
Where possible, grain merchants may lso pursue organisational growth through the e tablishment of
more locations to achieve scale economies. Third, the evidence of the yardstick effect of cooperatives is
justific tion for the policy support. Often characterized as in fficient, it is clear that grain m ke ng
cooperatives force improvemen s i producer welfare in the grai sector and thus provide ex-ante
production incentives o rain roduc rs. Th refore, policymakers may consider tax credits a d othe
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policy measures to incentivize grain marketing cooperatives to extend service coverage to areas in
which corporate grain merchants exert buyer power. Fourth, the discriminatory pricing behavior of
grain merchants is concerning as the spot market in the corn sector is often characterized as efficient
with relatively many buyers and sellers. In the absence of an efficient spot market, producers of other
commodities may face an even higher degree of spatial price discrimination if other mechanisms of
price discovery are not available. In the interest of both producer and consumer welfare, policymakers
may further investigate opportunities to limit the negative consequences of local monopsonies and
oligopsonies in the agricultural input procurement market.
We must also note several empirical limitations. First, we treated the state of Iowa as a
geographical island without explicit consideration of its neighbouring states. Distances and densities of
spatial competition may therefore have been underestimated for observations near the borders. Second,
we collected the corn cash price observations on one day. Taking an average over a longer time period,
such as one month or one year, may have eliminated the impact of random aberrations in pricing
decisions (e.g., inclement weather, equipment malfunctions). Third, our findings cannot be generalized
to other regions or commodities. Future research is needed to determine if the pricing behavior of
cooperatives and non-cooperatives is similar in, for example, the soybean market of Minnesota or the
livestock market of Kansas.
The current state of the empirical literature on spatial competition in the agricultural input
procurement market is not strong, but many opportunities to generate knowledge exist to inform
recommendations for practitioners and policymakers. For example, future research may address if
corporate and cooperative grain merchants exhibit the same pricing behavior (i) during the off-season,
(ii) in other states with less corn production, or (ii) in relation to non-spot market transactions
(i.e., contracts)? In terms of producer welfare, what degree of spatial price discrimination will farm
producers endure before engaging in group action? And what is the impact of the current regulation on
the ability of local monopsonists and oligopsonists to exert buyer power in relation to farm producers?
Answers to such questions may be addressed by different methodologies, including the many recent
advances in spatial econometrics [29,30].
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